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Introduction 
 
It is a truism that the influence of Darwin’s work on evolution is profound and 
ubiquitous. Thus, it should come as no surprise that the first chapter of Frans de Waal’s 
book, Good Natured, is entitled “Darwinian Dilemmas.” In this chapter, which sets the 
stage for his splendid discussion of observation of various kinds of moral behavior in 
primates, de Waal outlines the history of the debate over the biological status of morality 
since the implications of Darwinism began to be understood. Assuming Darwinism to be 
correct, moral behavior must have evolved along with all other features of living beings. 
The rest of de Waal’s book goes on to make a strong inductive case for the evolution of 
moral behaviors. In so doing, he provides a powerful attack on the traditional 
supernatural understanding of the origin of morality which takes morality to require a 
supernatural creator. Although most mainstream Western religious institutions now claim 
that evolution is consistent with their doctrines of the supernatural creator,1 the present 
discussion challenges this alleged consistency of traditional religion and evolution. The 
main contention of this paper is that if we take both evolution and concern for animal 
suffering seriously (as Darwin did), then we should reject traditional theism. 
If one is earnestly moved by the sufferings of nonhuman animals, must this really 
affect the religious views one holds? For those concerned about animal rights who are not 
philosophically inclined, the question may not be one that causes any anxiety. But for 
serious thinkers, the relation between animal suffering and religion is one that needs to be 
examined. The present paper begins its exploration of the connection between traditional 
religion and animal suffering by considering the religious opinions of Charles Darwin, 
who had serious doubts about religion based on the problem of animal pain. Although not 
all of Darwin’s views on animal suffering have been appreciated by defenders of animal 
rights,2 Darwin’s religious progress is of considerable interest, as it demonstrates the 
development of a persuasive agnostic stance out of a strong concern for animal suffering. 
The structure of my paper is as follows. Before setting out and defending Darwin’s 
arguments concerning religion, I begin by considering Alvin Plantinga’s recent (and 
influential) discussion of a controversial Darwinian passage (dubbed by Plantinga 
“Darwin’s Doubt”) which casts doubt on the standard interpretation of Darwin as a 
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defender of both the rationality of accepting evolution as well as the view that human 
rational powers evolved from those of nonhumans.3 After critiquing Plantinga’s 
interpretation of Darwin, I set out Darwin’s real doubts, those about religion, which 
involve an animal variation on the traditional problem of evil. As this particular problem 
has recently received much attention from serious theistic philosophers,4 I defend 
Darwin’s views against two of the best recent attempts by traditional theists to deal with 
the problem of animal pain. Both efforts are shown to be seriously flawed. After 
discussing and rejecting some non-traditional attempts to save religion from Darwin’s 
argument, I conclude with a general assessment of Darwin’s claims about religion.  
 
Darwin’s Doubts 
 
In several articles and a recent book, as well as numerous presentations, Alvin Plantinga 
has repeatedly drawn attention to words taken from an 1881 letter of Charles Darwin to 
William Graham to support Plantinga’s bold contention that it is irrational to accept 
evolutionary naturalism.5 Plantinga quotes with approval the following passage: 
 
With me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, 
which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or 
at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey’s mind, if 
there are any convictions in such a mind? [1898: I, 315-16] 
 
Plantinga interprets this passage as follows: 
 
Darwin…seem[s] to believe that (naturalistic) evolution gives one a reason to 
doubt that human cognitive faculties produce for the most part true beliefs: call 
this ‘Darwin’s Doubt’. [1993: 219] 
 
Those familiar with Plantinga’s work in epistemology will remember that Plantinga goes 
on to argue, using what he takes to be backing from Darwin, that belief in evolution 
actually leads to a strong form of skepticism. As Plantinga rejects skepticism, he 
concludes that only a theistic epistemology—one based on God as the designer of reliable 
human cognitive faculties—suffices to explain how knowledge of the world is possible. 
 
Although it may be tempting for Plantinga and his followers to read this passage from 
Darwin as supporting Plantinga’s claims, were Plantinga’s interpretation accurate, it 
would indeed be odd to learn that the most famous proponent of evolution thought his 
views on evolution led to a general skepticism which undermined confidence in all of our 
beliefs, including our ethical beliefs and scientific beliefs.6 (The latter category would 
include even Darwin’s own work on evolution!) But Plantinga’s interpretation does not 
seem to be an careful rendering of Darwin, whose actual views on these matters are in 
fact much more insightful than the remarks by Plantinga would suggest.7
 
Darwin’s mature view is better expressed by the following quote from another letter, 
written to Lord Farrer almost two months after Darwin’s letter to Graham: 
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On the other hand, if we consider the whole universe, the mind refuses to look at 
it as the outcome of chance—that is, without design or purpose. The whole 
question seems to me insoluble, for I cannot put much or any faith in the so-called 
intuitions of the human mind, which have been developed, as I cannot doubt, 
from such a mind as animals possess; and what would their convictions or 
intuitions be worth? [my emphasis; 1903: 395] 
 
As this quote makes clear, Darwin’s real doubts do not extend to evolution; they are 
restricted to the question of the nature of the origin of the universe, to the trust that one 
should have in the “convictions or intuitions” that humans have on this topic alone. But 
why should humans not trust these convictions? Darwin’s surprising answer to this 
question appears in the following comment from his Autobiography: 
 
But then arises the doubt—can the mind of man, which has, as I fully believe, 
been developed from a mind as low as that possessed by the lowest animal, be 
trusted when it draws such grand conclusions? May not these be the result of the 
connection between cause and effect which strikes us as a necessary one, but 
probably depends merely on inherited experience? Nor must we overlook the 
probability of the constant inculcation of a belief in God on the minds of children 
producing so strong and perhaps an inherited effect on their brains, not as yet 
fully developed, that it would be as difficult for them to throw off their belief in 
God, as for a monkey to throw off its instinctive fear and hatred of a snake. I 
cannot pretend to throw the least light on such abstruse problems. The mystery of 
the beginning of all things is insoluble to us; and I for one must be content to 
remain an agnostic. [1958: 93-94]  
 
These passages again demonstrate that Darwin’s real doubts apply only to “grand 
conclusions” about God and the ultimate origin of the universe. For Darwin these doubts 
may well have a purely naturalistic explanation. Just as a monkey cannot help reacting to 
a snake, Darwin wonders whether a Divine Purpose account of creation is also something 
we humans cannot help but have. He suggests that those who accept an evolutionary 
account of human existence need to be wary of “grand conclusions” humans make 
without adequate supporting evidence, since the having of these convictions may have 
played an important evolutionary role in human origination. For, just as monkeys who 
reacted to snakes in the past survived better than those who did not, perhaps, similarly, 
humans who had strong traditional religious beliefs may have also survived better in the 
past than those who did not. 
 
So far we have seen that Darwin did not doubt the reliability of ordinary human beliefs 
about the world, but only “grand conclusions” about the origin of the Universe. What is 
not yet explained is why Darwin thought that standard theism was improbable. Once 
again, comments on religion from his Autobiography provide the answer: 
 
That there is much suffering in the world no one disputes. Some have attempted 
to explain this in reference to man by imagining that it serves for his moral 
improvement. But the number of men in the world is as nothing compared with 
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that of all other sentient beings, and these often suffer greatly without any moral 
improvement. A being so powerful and so full of knowledge as a God who could 
create the universe, is to our finite minds omnipotent and omniscient, and it 
revolts our understanding to suppose that his benevolence is not unbounded, for 
what advantage can there be in the sufferings of millions of the lower animals 
throughout almost endless time? This very old argument from the existence of 
suffering against the existence of an intelligent first cause seems to me a strong 
one; whereas, as just remarked, the presence of much suffering agrees well with 
the view that all organic beings have been developed through variation and 
natural selection. [my emphasis; 1958: 90] 
 
Although Darwin calls this a “very old argument,” it is important to point out that 
standard discussions of the problem that suffering raises for the existence of God, usually 
called “The Problem of Evil,” have been, until quite recently, almost always concerned 
exclusively with the suffering endured by human beings. It has been rather rare to find 
significant concern over the natural suffering of nonhumans.8 I find it supremely fitting 
that Darwin the naturalist takes the existence of massive nonhuman suffering to 
counterbalance what he also admits to be strong arguments in favor of theism: namely, 
appeals to first cause, design and mystical experience.9 But, just how problematic is the 
problem of animal pain for the theist? It is to this debate that we now turn. 
 
The Problem of Animal Pain 
 
The classic discussion of the problem that animal pain raises for the rationality of 
accepting standard theism is David Hume’s 1779 discussion in his Dialogues Concerning 
Natural Religion. Hume remarks: 
 
Men pursue pleasure as eagerly as they avoid pain; at least, they might have been 
so constituted. It seems, therefore, plainly possible to carry on the business of life 
without any pain. Why then is any animal ever rendered susceptible of such a 
sensation? If animals can be free from it an hour, they might enjoy a perpetual 
exemption from it…[my emphasis; 1779: Book XI, 206] 
 
Although certainly challenging to traditional theists, one can only speculate why Hume’s 
concerns about animal pain were not generally found convincing. It is probably 
reasonable to suppose that the lack of a well worked-out alternative to Special Creation 
(the view that God specifically created each individual species) made it hard for skeptics 
to convince the religious orthodox. Hume had pointed out that there were various ways in 
which the design in nature could be explained without relying on a Special Creator,10 but 
he also admitted that: 
 
So well adjusted are the organs and capacities of all animals, and so well fitted to 
their preservation, that, as far as history or tradition reaches, there appears not to 
be any single species which has yet been extinguished in the universe. [1779: 
Book XI, 207] 
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Saddled with the doctrine of fixed species, it was hard for Hume to make a really 
convincing case for an alternative to Special Creation, in spite of the moral problem that 
animal pain raises for the standard theist. Darwin, of course, changed all that. By 
providing a serious competitor to the Special Creation doctrine, Darwin enabled those 
who worried about the problem of evil to deflect the troubling criticism that any 
alternative to standard theism could not adequately explain the obvious evidence of 
design that we find in the world around us.  
 
Until relatively recently, the attempt to reply to the problem of evil has focused on 
whether there is an adequate explanation for evil that would explain why God would 
permit its existence. The explanations typically rely heavily on reasons that would justify 
evil being suffered by human beings.11 Human free will, human character building, and 
Original Sin are among the most popular of the score of traditional reasons typically 
offered to explain evil.12 All of these are significantly flawed in their own right.13 More 
importantly, for the purposes of the present discussion, all of these traditional reasons for 
evil clearly share a devastating common failing. They all fail to account for animal 
suffering. Only a theist who denied that animals other than humans ever suffer could 
consistently rest content with one of the old standard reasons.14  
 
During the past decade or so, discussion of the problem of evil has importantly changed 
focus. Two of the most important concerns have been (1) the replacement of the search 
for a deductively compelling version of the argument from evil (which proved illusive) 
with discussion of the evidential worries that evil poses for the theist, and (2) a stunning 
realization of the serious problem that nonhuman animal suffering poses for the theist.15 
The two concerns powerfully come together in the work of Paul Draper.16 In his 
important [1989] discussion Draper puts the problem as a comparison between the 
(epistemic) probability of evil given standard theism and the probability of evil given 
what he calls “the hypothesis of indifference.” The hypothesis of indifference (HI) is the 
claim that “neither the nature nor the condition of sentient beings on earth is the result of 
benevolent or malevolent actions performed by non-human persons.”[1989: 332] Draper 
goes on to argue that the probability of evil given HI is much greater than the probability 
of evil given theism. Draper in particular observes that “sentient beings experiencing pain 
or pleasure that we do not know to be biologically useful” is much more to be expected 
given HI than given theism. In this, his view is similar to that of Darwin, who, as noted 
above, remarks: “the presence of much suffering agrees well with the view that all 
organic beings have been developed through variation and natural selection,” but does 
not agree well with the traditional theistic view of a benevolent First Cause. Darwin’s 
agnosticism is based on his own concern that the evidence the naturalists find does not 
support a theistic designer. Draper’s and Darwin’s claims have recently been challenged. 
I now turn to two such challenges. 
 
In several discussions, Daniel Howard-Snyder has tried to rebut Draper’s charges as 
follows:17 
 
What about biologically gratuitous pain? Draper is certainly right that we and the 
brutes experience a lot of prolonged and intense suffering that serves no 
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biological purpose. And perhaps we should not expect anything else on HI.…But 
why, according to Draper, should we expect much less biologically gratuitous 
pain on theism…?…Draper doesn’t give us any reason to think that the two cases 
are not equal in relevant respects and I can think of nothing plausible to fill the 
gap. [1994: 463] 
 
Howard-Snyder’s attack is based on challenging what he calls “Draper’s Assumption,” 
the claim that “we should expect on theism to discover a connection between morally 
justifying goods and pain.”[463] (This assumption is also one Darwin seems willing to 
make.) Howard-Snyder’s challenge is based on two specific arguments, the “Argument 
from Progress” and the “Argument from Complexity.”[1994: 464] The Argument from 
Progress starts from the observation that human knowledge has progressed in a variety of 
fields of human inquiry and then points out that although there were periods in which 
new intrinsic goods were discovered, there were certainly also periods in which nothing 
new was discovered. From these two claims Howard-Snyder infers 
 
[I]t is at least as antecedently likely as not that there has been the sort of periodic 
progress in the discovery of goods that strongly suggests that there remain goods 
to be discovered, hence goods we are ignorant of. 
 
From this he concludes that we “should hardly be surprised that, given theism, we would 
not discover a connection between morally justifying goods and pain.”[Ibid.]  
 
One objection that might be raised against Howard-Snyder’s argument is it assumes that 
human progress in knowledge acquisition is equally probable on theism and on the 
hypothesis of indifference. The problem with this assumption is since knowledge is (by 
and large) an intrinsic good, it seems antecedently surprising on theism that human 
knowledge would evolve slowly and that there would be periods in which nothing new 
discovered was discovered. After all, would not a benevolent Deity regularly grant 
creatures large amounts of significant knowledge?18 By contrast, the evolution of human 
knowledge is not at all surprising on the hypothesis of indifference. To respond to this 
complaint, the theist must resort to the claim that God must have had some hidden reason 
for allowing the incremental development of human knowledge. Why should there be 
hidden reasons? Answering this question leads to Howard-Snyder’s second argument. 
 
Howard-Snyder’s second argument, the Argument from Complexity, repeats a very 
familiar refrain:19 
 
It would not be surprising if God…would pursue the realization of some very 
great goods. Now one thing that [such great goods] share when compared to 
[lesser goods] is…that each illustrates the fact that the value of a state of affairs is 
sometime greater since that state of affairs is more complex. So it is at least as 
antecedently likely as not that God…would aim to realize some very complex 
state of affairs. Since much of the suffering [we observe] is so horrifyingly bad as 
to defy adequate description, it would take correspondingly great goods to justify 
its permission. In that case, it’s at least as antecedently likely as not that God’s 
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reasons for permitting these horrors have to do with very complex states of 
affairs. Now, one of the well-known drawbacks of the human cognitive condition 
is that we are able to conceive of states of affairs of fairly limited complexity. 
Therefore, it is at least as antecedently likely as not that were God to have a 
reason to permit [these horrors], it would have to do with good states of affairs 
that are too complex for us to grasp given our present cognitive capacities. And 
so…[we have] good reason to be wholly unsurprised that, on theism, we would 
not discover a connection between morally justifying goods and pain.[Ibid.] 
 
Howard-Snyder’s second complaint is that if we accept the limitations of human 
understanding, then we can explain away any tendency to be surprised by the evil we find 
in the world given theism by chalking up evil to incomprehensible greater goods that 
would require it. This argument also faces an important challenge regarding knowledge. 
That there would be truly remarkable, complex states of affairs we could not comprehend 
is presumably not more surprising on the hypothesis of indifference than on theism. But, 
whether, given Howard-Snyder’s earlier reminder of the evolution of human knowledge, 
we should still expect massive human ignorance about the goodness of all such complex 
states of affairs is much less clear. Is it really reasonable to expect that a species capable 
of producing marvels of understanding such as Gödel’s Theorem, the Periodic Table, 
Relativity Theory, Quantum Mechanics, and the Theory of Evolution could not fathom at 
least certain aspects of the justification of the distribution of the suffering we observe? Is 
it really beyond God’s ability to teach us even the rudiments, no matter how sketchy or 
incomplete, of an adequate account of evil? Or, failing that, is it really impossible for 
God to make our defects sufficiently known so that we could see why we cannot grasp 
the sort of complex good that the world’s present suffering requires?20 The inviting 
negative answer to these three questions shows that Howard-Snyder’s argument from 
complexity is most unconvincing as an attempt to undercut Draper’s Assumption. 
 
Rebutting Howard-Snyder’s attack on Draper’s (and Darwin’s) Assumption is all well 
and good, but it is still worth asking whether there are significant reasons that would 
support the assumption. The theist critic might urge that what might have persuaded 
Darwin and may still be influencing Draper is a false belief in the ability of human beings 
to understand anything worth understanding, combined, perhaps, with some version of 
inevitable progress left over from the influence of Social Darwinist thought. While one 
should be wary of such influences, it seems to me that our discussion so far has suggested 
that there are other reasons that would support Draper’s Assumption. Darwin speaks of a 
being whose “benevolence is unbounded.” It is reasonable to view benevolence as 
involving education on matters of great concern, such as the problem of evil. Also, 
Draper, following Hume’s lead, speaks of the analogy between God and a good 
parent.[1989: 344] It is surely incumbent on good parents to provide sufficient education 
on important matters (even if limited to the level of a child’s understanding). Whether 
these reasons are sufficient to support Draper’s Assumption will, I expect, be 
controversial.  
 
Part of the controversy will probably lie in there being radically different accounts of 
what “good parenting” requires. Some, following a more traditional, authoritarian model, 
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will urge that the good parent is a strict authoritarian, one who commands that the child 
does as she is told, that she does not ask questions and that she never challenges 
authority. A good parent on this model will not be expected to inform the child of what is 
going on or to explain how things work out for the best. Others, in line with a more 
modern trend, will insist that good parenting, while being protective, emphasizes nurture 
and care, and that good parents promote development of the child through increasing her 
understanding of the world. Such a mode of parenting establishes its authority through 
love, not fear. Since I clearly favor the second kind of parenting, as I regard it as morally 
preferable, I cannot help but try to conceive of a Divine Parent on such a model. On such 
a conception, Howard-Snyder’s defenses against the problem of animal pain do not make 
sense. 
 
Before proceeding, I think it important to consider in general why attempts such as 
Howard-Snyder’s to explain away worries about animal pain are prima facie implausible. 
My suggestion is that attempts to imagine a situation in which the existing animal 
suffering would be counter-balanced by some greater good remain most unconvincing. It 
seems clear that there is no good reason for animal suffering involving only animals 
themselves. As Hume pointed out long ago, the “necessities of nature” might be 
prompted not by pain but by a “diminution of pleasure.”21 There is also no compelling 
reason for animal suffering that involves humans. To claim that animal suffering is 
required for human character building, free will, etc. not only ignores the huge amount of 
animal suffering in nature which has no effect on humans at all.22 To avoid this last 
problem, suppose we try to justify animal suffering in terms of requirements involving 
another kind of creature, for example a very large number of idiotic giants, modeled 
perhaps after the Cyclops, who live on other planets but are obsessed with observing all 
nonhuman suffering on Earth through powerful telescopes, so no bit of animal suffering 
ever goes unobserved. If there are enough giants on other planets and if every bit of 
animal suffering goes towards improving the moral situation of these pathetic giants, the 
theist might claim that earthly animal suffering was counterbalanced by creating greater 
goods elsewhere in the universe.23 However unlikely this situation might appear to us, 
and even if we accept the crude Utilitarian calculations it presupposes, the Cyclopsian 
scenario faces a standard problem confronting most theistic attempts to explain away the 
existence of evil.24 This is the problem of making it plausible to believe that God, an all-
powerful and all-knowing being, really had no better method available for the moral 
improvement of the Cyclopsian race than to permit the huge amount of animal suffering 
we find on Earth. Since we can, with no apparent difficulty, imagine God making video 
tapes of animal suffering, or showing movies of animal suffering to produce the same 
good extra-terrestrial effect, to think of God’s ingenuity being defeated by the mental 
limitations of the Cyclopsian hordes is a possibility that is hard to take seriously. Clearly 
a deeper reason is needed to make the necessity of animal suffering plausible. At this 
point it would seem instructive to turn to a second, and seemingly more promising way 
for the theist to deal with the problem of animal pain, namely Van Inwagen’s appeal to 
natural order. 
 
Van Inwagen’s attack on the evidential argument from evil proceeds by suggesting that 
there is a defense the theist might use to explain nonhuman suffering based on an appeal 
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to order.[1991: 143] By “defense,” Van Inwagen means not a conclusive theodicy but “a 
story, a story that is true for all I know.” Van Inwagen’s Order Defense claims that 
nonhuman suffering is due to the requirement of order, and that if there were not the 
amount of such suffering that we find in the world, then the world would be “massively 
irregular,” which would be a defect at least as great as having nonhuman suffering.[Ibid.] 
Van Inwagen goes on to argue, as the title of his article, “The Problem of Evil, the 
Problem of Air and the Problem of Silence,” suggests that his strategy is the same as that 
employed by early defenders of naturalism who encountered difficulty with a particular 
scientific theory, viz. atomism. The beauty of his argument is that it shows how theists 
and non-theists alike need to rely on common defensive strategies. 
 
One worry faced by Van Inwagen’s strategy of comparing the problem of animal pain for 
the theist to the problem of air for the atomist is obvious for anyone who remembers 
Kuhn’s [1970] contribution to the history of science. Kuhn pointed out the importance of 
anomalies, problems that resist explanation by the dominant theory. They often have a 
way of festering, eventually leading researchers to abandon the dominant theory in favor 
of an alternative account. Critics of Van Inwagen might urge that the problem of animal 
pain is just such an anomaly for the theist’s theory that God is all-good, all-powerful and 
all-knowing. Van Inwagen could be expected to reply that whether the problem of animal 
pain turns out to be such an anomaly has not yet been established, so it is premature to 
make claims one way or another. Van Inwagen’s Order-Defense against Draper is similar 
to Howard-Snyder’s Argument from Complexity in placing the explanation of nonhuman 
suffering beyond current human capacity. Van Inwagen apparently leaves it open whether 
humans will ever discover enough details about the defense to count as a genuine 
understanding of evil. But, given his reliance on “extreme modal and moral skepticism 
(or, one might say, humility) in matters unrelated to the concerns of everyday life”[1991: 
151], it seems unlikely on his view that humans will every have such knowledge.25  
 
Given the paucity of information available to us about how order in the world is supposed 
to work, and also granted Van Inwagen’s insistence on modal and moral skepticism, it is 
indeed hard to demonstrate conclusively that Van Inwagen’s claims about order 
explaining animal suffering are incorrect. While with Hume we seem easily able to 
imagine alternative ways the world might have been ordered which would not have 
involved allowing the infliction of massive suffering on nonhumans, the reply to the 
Humean charge by defenders of order is to repeat the claim that, in spite of appearances, 
the order afforded by the present arrangement of nonhuman suffering in the world really 
does work out for the best.  
 
On the other hand, it is hard to find compelling reasons to accept Van Inwagen’s faith in 
order (which is very reminiscent of the famous satire in Voltaire’s Candide of the 
Leibnizian refrain that this is the best of all possible worlds). In the absence of some 
reason to do so, it looks as though Van Inwagen’s defense against animal pain is weak 
indeed: perhaps it will be somewhat comforting for those who desperately want to be 
theists, but still disconcerting for those who wish to understand why animals need to 
suffer. I find it revealing that Van Inwagen does not attempt to provide any reasons to 
support his appeal to order to account for God’s allowing massive animal suffering.  
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Conversely, Peter Vardy, who accepts evolution but also appeals to an Order Defense to 
explain animal suffering, does try to offer reasons that would improve the plausibility of 
the order defense. Sensitive to the Humeans’ worry, Vardy is well aware of the question: 
 
Could not God have created a universe in which the developing world could have 
been brought about with less extreme pain and suffering, where all animals only 
ate grass and did not prey on each other? [1997: 141] 
 
Vardy’s reply is: 
 
Clearly such a world would be radically different from this one. All animals 
would grow old and die of natural causes…Many species would die of starvation 
as the plant resources on which they fed were used up by other animals. The 
whole idea of evolution would have to be abandoned as the “survival of the 
fittest” is the most effective tool to ensure evolutionary quality. [my emphasis, 
Ibid.] 
 
This leads Vardy to conclude: 
 
To reject evolution, therefore, is not to reject a harsh way of creating a world in 
favor of a gentler one. It is to reject the best and most effective way of creating a 
world of great beauty, richness, diversity and adaptability which has within it the 
possibility of love and the higher virtues. [1997: 142] 
 
An important contrast in Vardy’s discussion over that of Van Inwagen is Vardy’s attempt 
to discover a cogent reason for animal pain. What is less than persuasive in Vardy’s 
reasoning is the implication that God would have had to use exactly the historical record 
of evolution, replete with dinosaurs, etc., to achieve the level of beauty and richness that 
we find in the world, not to mention “evolutionary quality.” Is God really so limited in 
terms of the methods that might have been used? Given the richness of the fossil record, 
what reason would we have to think that Vardy is right? Furthermore, there is some 
reason to think that Vardy’s talk of evolutionary quality is not consistent with standard 
Darwinianism. Not only would Darwin be hard-pressed to explain what evolutionary 
quality comes to; he also points out bizarre adaptations, such as 
 
geese and frigate-birds with webbed feet, lining on the dry land and rarely 
alighting on the water.…long-toed corncrakes, living in meadows instead of in 
swamps…woodpeckers where hardly a tree grows. [1859: 132-133] 
 
All of these are well explained using evolution, but none of them seem to count as cases 
of evolutionary quality. So, Vardy’s attempt to justify an order defense seems to me to 
fail. 
 
Suppose, therefore, that we find the appeal to order to explain animal suffering less than 
compelling. Is there any good reason to think that Van Inwagen and Vardy’s approach to 
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this problem is problematic for the theist? I think there are indeed some significant costs 
associated with the Order Defense that should make it unattractive for the traditional 
theist. One worry that a theist who embraced Order Defense would have to face is what I 
will call the Problem of Prayer. It is common for theists to pray for such things as world 
peace and an end to hunger, ignorance, violence and suffering. It is also to be expected 
that theists who care about animal misery will pray that animals not suffer, either due to 
human causes or to natural predation. But, are these actions reasonable? For all we know, 
war, starvation, animal predation and suffering may well be part of the regularity created 
by God. So, should we pray for these things and be happy when we learn more of the 
many instances of them? A second worry closely related to this is what I will term the 
Problem of Action. Devout theists typically believe themselves required to act so as to 
improve the world around them. For many, this involves contributing monetarily to 
missionary work in areas far away from their everyday life. For others, this contribution 
takes the form of personal involvement. This is especially the case for many concerned 
about animal rights. Some have argued that we have an obligation to try to interfere with 
predation in nature.26 But, are such actions contributing to irregularity in the world, or do 
they preserve order? They certainly do change things, and the changes would typically be 
viewed by theists as being good, as making things better. Given Van Inwagen’s strictures, 
these activities would need to be rethought. These two worries face the consistent theist 
who embraces Van Inwagen’s Order Defense. They are but two problems associated with 
an approach that would justify a passive, defeatist, quietist approach to the problems in 
the world around us. And as this is a high price to pay, it seems to me that the reflective 
theist needs to think carefully before adopting Van Inwagen’s way out. 
 
Religious Alternatives to Standard Theism?27
 
A natural philosophical reaction to the discussion so far from those who take animal 
suffering to be important might be to suggest modifying the standard religious 
perspective so that the problem of animal suffering will go away. I would like briefly to 
consider two significant alternatives to standard theism that do not face the problem of 
animal suffering haunting the honest rational theist. The two obvious possibilities that 
suggest themselves are the Limited-God Defense and Reincarnation.28 The problem of 
animal suffering is that it is unfair, given God’s knowledge and power, for God not to 
interfere to prevent unnecessary animal suffering. Defenders of the Limited God Defense 
would suggest that animal suffering is not unnecessary: since God is limited with respect 
to power, God cannot prevent more evil, including animal suffering. Defenders of the 
Reincarnation Strategy would urge that animal suffering is not unfair, as there is a cycle 
of birth and re-birth that all living creatures, including all humans, are required to pass 
through. So, it is not as though human suffering is rewarded with a meaningful afterlife 
and animal suffering is not. Let us briefly consider each of these in turn. 
 
A prominent defender of the Limited God Defense, Peter Bertocci, rejects the existence, 
not of God, but of a “God of absolute power.” One of Bertocci’s reasons for rejecting the 
traditional conception of God is the existence of “natural evil which produces more harm 
than good.” Among the prominent examples of natural evil, he cites the following: 
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Nor does the coupling of omnipotence and love easily satisfy the mind which 
holds before it the facts of evolution, such as the wiping out of whole species and 
the mutations making for maladjustment. The great amount of animal pain in the 
world must be taken into account. [1951: 416] 
 
The obvious advantage for the theist of using the strategy of claiming God’s powers are 
limited for dealing with the problem of animal pain is that it appears to remove God’s 
responsibility for interfering in the world to prevent animal suffering. Defenders of this 
ingenious strategy have traditionally faced the objections that their view, which denies 
omnipotence, does not count as a true version of theism and, also, that their view casts 
doubt on God’s ability to perform actions deemed necessary for a meaningful theistic 
perspective such as performing miracles and securing a just afterlife. It is difficult to 
fathom why a Limited God would be powerful enough to create the Universe but not 
powerful enough to prevent the more horrible cases of animal suffering that we discover. 
One has to wonder whether the Limited God that Bertocci and his followers embrace is 
only limited with respect to power. Perhaps their deity is also limited with respect to 
knowledge and/or goodness. Hume puts the criticism sharply: 
 
It would have been better, were [the Author of nature’s] powers extremely 
limited, to have created fewer animals, and to have endowed these with more 
faculties for their happiness and preservation. A builder is never esteemed prudent 
who undertakes a plan beyond what his stock will enable him to finish. [1779: 
Book XI, 208] 
 
This leads to the third and perhaps most troublesome worry for the theist who is flirting 
with the Limited God strategy, namely whether a limited, imprudent God, one who 
permitted massive animal suffering, really would be a being worthy, not merely of 
respect, but of worship. Other great but limited beings, saints and heroes, clearly merit 
respect, but not worship. Once God is similarly limited, the problem of justifying the 
worship-worthiness of God needs to be addressed.  
 
Another strategy for dealing with the problem of animal pain is to urge that perhaps all 
living creatures do not only have one form of existence which culminates in their death 
but, rather, that all living creatures experience a cycle of reincarnation, being re-born into 
a series of different life-forms until they achieve sufficient merit to exit to eternal reward. 
This strategy avoids the problem of animal pain by maintaining that animal suffering is 
fair: those animals who suffer merit their misery due to sins they committed in previous 
lives. While such a view is typically not part of Western theism, it has been an essential 
ingredient of important non-Western religions. The theist concerned about animal 
suffering might well be tempted to adopt this scheme to explain animal pain. 
 
The reincarnation proponent faces three groups of concerns. First, there are technical 
worries such as what the re-incarnation cycle is, how many stages there are, how it starts 
and ends, which behaviors merit which rebirths, etc. Second, there is a substantive 
complaint from those who worry about personal identity. If we and other suffering 
animals are supposed to be incarnations of the same person, then why is it hard to find 
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any strong memorial linkages from previous stages to our current stage?29 After all, 
memory connections are an important ingredient of personal identity. Third, there is a 
deep moral concern about the basic presupposition of reincarnation that certain life forms 
are supposed to serve as the moral punishing ground for other life forms. Why should this 
be? Why shouldn’t a particular life form merit its own punishment on its own terms? 
Those who accept re-incarnation also are forced to accept the idea that some forms really 
are better, more deserving than others. Many who are concerned about animals will find 
this claim highly problematic. Why would an all-good deity set up such a pattern of 
existence? One might be tempted to answer these disturbing challenges by retreating back 
to one of the previous strategies that we have discussed (for example, the Order Defense 
or the Limited God approach). So, it looks as though an appeal to reincarnation will not 
offer any additional help towards solving the problem of animal pain.  
 
Conclusion 
 
It is now time for summing up. The first goal of the paper was to show how Darwin’s 
consideration of nonhuman suffering led him to embrace an evidential form of the 
problem of evil. I think that Darwin was considerably ahead of his time on this matter. 
The second goal of the paper was to evaluate recent criticisms of the animal pain version 
of the evidential problem of evil. My judgment is that these criticisms either miss the 
mark or entail burdens no reasonable theist would wish to bear. Some alternatives to 
standard theism have been considered and rejected. My tentative conclusion is that, in the 
absence of further argumentation, Darwin’s agnosticism is more reasonable than standard 
theism.  
 
Whether agnosticism is more reasonable than current versions of naturalism is another 
matter. As we have seen, Darwin is officially on record as claiming that evolution should 
not be trusted to produce accurate judgments as to the origin of the universe. Is he right? 
On the one hand, we must grant that evolution produces creatures adapted for survival. 
We know, given current existing religious disagreements, that human survival without 
religious truth must be possible for the majority of humankind. We have no guarantee 
human evolution will produce cognitive capacities that will yield reliable religious belief. 
On the other hand, as Darwin admitted, often a capacity which evolves for one purpose 
turns out to be able to perform other functions quite well. The same may be true of the 
cognitive capacities humans have evolved so far. Perhaps our powers of evidence 
gathering, reflection and argument will enable us to solve the problem of our origins. We 
should take comfort from parallel efforts, such as de Waal’s, which help provide an 
evolutionary naturalistic grounding for morality. If we can trust our morality, this should 
give us some reason to have confidence in the power of evolution to produce meaningful 
insights about our origins.30
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Notes 
 
1 At this writing the most significant recent convert to evolution is Pope John Paul II’s 24 
October 1996 endorsement of evolution as more than merely a theory. 
2 For a critique of Darwin’s defense of vivisection in medical research see Rachels’ 
discussion [1990:212-221] 
3 This discussion is important not only for my purposes but also for those who see de 
Waal’s work on the evolution of morality as following in the Darwinian tradition. 
4 See, for example, Daniel Howard-Snyder, ed., 1996, and Peter Vardy, 1997. 
5 See Plantinga [1991] and [1993]. 
6 It would, of course, cast extreme doubt on the value of de Waal’s project. 
7 I am very grateful to Evan Fales for making me aware of Plantinga’s misinterpretation. 
For an insightful review of Plantinga, see his [1994]. 
8 The important exception to this rule is David Hume’s discussion of animal pain in Book 
IX of his classic, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. 
9 See Darwin [1958: 90] 
10 Hume [1779], Books VII and VIII. 
11 See Rachels’ fine summary discussion, [1990: 105-6]. 
12 For a careful analysis of the problem of evil and classic presentation of the Free Will 
Defense, see Plantinga [1977], Part I. 
13 For a critique of probably the most popular theistic strategy to explain evil, the Free-
Will Defense, see Kraemer and Jones [1985]. 
14 In retrospect one sees why William Rowe’s attacks on theistic defenses against evil 
were so powerful, as Rowe often took examples of animal suffering that did not involve 
any human action. See Rowe’s papers in Howard-Snyder, ed. [1996] 
15 See Howard-Snyder’s introduction in Howard-Snyder, ed. [1996]. 
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16 See Howard-Snyder, ed. [1996]for two of Draper’s papers plus extensive critical 
discussion of them. 
17 I have simplified my presentation of Howard-Snyder’s quote to avoid complexity that 
does not affect the points I wish to make. 
18 The role of knowledge in the Garden of Eden story raises worries for the traditional 
Western theist: if knowledge is valuable, then why didn’t God create Adam and Eve with 
more of it? 
19 Some would say that it involves an “Appeal to Human Ignorance.” See Kraemer and 
Jones [1985]. 
20 As, for instance, we are able to comprehend our limitations vis-à-vis other animals 
when it comes to observing other aspects of reality. 
21 See Hume [1779], Book XI. 
22 There are many other objections that come to mind. Here are two: this approach treats 
animals merely as means, and it makes humans out to be much more stupid than they are. 
23 For an insightful discussion of counterbalancing vs. defeating good and evil, see 
Chisholm [1968]. 
24 For a classic statement of this problem, see Mackie [1955]. 
25 This indicates an important disanalogy between Van Inwagen’s order-defense against 
evil and the scientific defenses he considers concerning the problems of air and silence.  
26 For an extensive discussion, see Sapontzis [1987], Ch. 13. 
27 I am indebted to panel members from the SSEA session as well as spirited discussants 
from the audience for raising the alternatives discussed in this section. 
28 Rachels discusses and convincingly criticizes a third option, that of embracing Deism 
in his [1990: Ch. 3]. 
29 While it is a curiosity that some people will claim having existed previously as other 
human beings, it is rare to find claims as to which suffering animal/s one previously was. 
If reincarnation were, indeed, the rule rather than the exception, as the reincarnation 
strategy requires, then one would expect reflective human beings to remember events 
from their own, past nonhuman lives, events which included significant suffering. One 
would also count on these recollections to trigger a more caring general outlook towards 
the treatment of nonhuman animals. 
30 I am indebted to comments from Evan Fales, Ronald Glass, Harlan Miller, Alvin 
Plantinga, Louis Pojman, S.F. Sapontzis, my excellent fellow SSEA symposiasts and the 
lively audience discussants at the Central Division SSEA Meetings in Pittsburgh, April 
1997. I am also grateful for Joe LaPorte’s comments on an earlier version. 
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